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Abstract
Physical security is considered an integral part of information systems security. The idea that small devices pose
a security threat for enterprises is well established. On the other hand, consented and supervised access to USB
ports via USB flash drives is sometimes allowed. This paper will highlight the risk associated with this kind of
access by devices such as IPods and USB flash drives. It will show a proof of concept USB device that runs
automatically once connected to a personal computer and copies files and folders from the victim's computer to
its storage and executes potentially harmful code on the computer without the user's knowledge. The paper then
provides measures necessary to mitigate this type of physical attacks.
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INTRODUCTION
USB Flash Drives (UFD) or “USB sticks” are becoming popular means of storing and transporting data and
applications. UFD sales worldwide reached $2 billion US Dollars in 2005, according to Gartner research.
Gartner expects UFD sales to increase fifteen percent per year through the year 2010, driven in part by interest in
"USB smart drives" carrying software or operating environments (Roush 2006). USB Flash Drives (UFD) are
becoming increasingly capacious and affordable with drives at a capacity of onegigabyte selling for a rate of for
$4050 US Dollars for the low end ones and $60100 US Dollars for the ones with high end components or smart
features (Bowman 2006, Roush 2006). This in turn led to a rise in the level of corporate data theft by rogue
employees sneaking corporate data out of the workplace on memory sticks, iPods and mobile phones (AAP
2006).

UFD THREATS TO THE CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT
The increase in capacity and affordability and the decrease in size of UFD's have made them into a security risk
in a form of a covert tool for stealing data from the corporate network. The Australian Computer Crime and
Security Survey found that theft or breach of confidential information accounted for the highest portion of
financial losses in 2005 at an average of $2 million Australian Dollars per company (AAP 2006).
UFDs may also be used as an effective channel for transferring malicious software, pornographic materials or
other illegal software or hacking tools to the corporate network. UFD transferred tools can then be used within
the corporate environment to conduct corporate espionage and execute tools that may not otherwise be
transferable or executable in the corporate environment.
Moreover, UFDs may involuntarily become means of storage and transfer of malicious code. Employees
transferring files from home or other sources such as Internet cafes to the company network on a UFD may not
be aware of viruses, Trojans or other maliciouscode programs on the device that they might be bringing into the

corporate environment. Transferred files may also introduce the corporation to possible prosecution as they may
be in breach of copyright laws such as pirated music files, electronic books, videos and software (Lomas 2006).
Many corporations and government agencies have realized the threat of USB devices in general and UFD drives
in particular and have devised policies to mitigate risks from such devices. Some went as far as banning the
devices while others went even further and poured superglue into USB ports to disable them (AAP 2006, Lomas
2006).

RISKS FROM CONSENTED USE OF USB DEVICES
Consented use of USB devices means that the USB device is used under supervision of the owner or user of the
computer containing the USB port. Someone might for example ask the owner if he could show him a
presentation that he has stored on his USB device or transfer a document or spread sheet to the owner of the
computer. The owner in this case unknowingly says yes thinking that he will supervise this operation and that
nothing covert will happen. This may be true sometimes but not always. Consented use of USB devices can be a
threat to both personal computers and corporate networks.
For example, a security researcher have created a proof of concept program called Slurp that resides on Apple’s
iPod USBenabled device that executes covertly once the device is connected to computer’s USB port for
charging reasons. The small but efficient program then searches the computer for files with certain extensions
that are likely associated with businesscritical data and can theoretically download them to the iPod device at a
rate of around 100MB every two minutes in a process called 'podslurping' (Usher 2006). The program does not
however copy any files but rather show the user how many files it found (Geek.com 2006).
This small utility demonstrated how quickly and easily someone with privileged access via USB can steal data
covertly using an iPod or any similar portable USB storage device. This utility also highlighted the fact that
many people will not normally allow others to get USB access to their computers without them being present but
they would happily accept someone charging their iPod devices from their computer in their presence thinking
that the supervised charging process is harmless.
Call to Arms
Slurp for iPod presented a fresh perspective on USB device covert use and abuse. While its creator intended for it
to be used as a scare tactic for companies to warn them about the threat of such devices it was also in effect a call
to arms for disgruntle employees, hackers and data thieves alike. Covert and administratorlevel access to files
with the ability to execute programs and transfer files to the relatively large size of USB storage devices with the
high transfer speed of USB 2.0 presented hackers with a very lucrative endeavour. What was even more lucrative
is the ability to transfer files to the target computer and the ability to change registry settings and create users on
the target machines. The Pod Slurping concept made the hacking and security community think about porting
the concept to USB Flash Drives more commonly known as USB Memory Sticks. The only problem was that
there was no way to easily, covertly, and automatically execute programs once the device is plugged into the
target computer. This is because USB storage devices are not designed to AutoRun programs unlike CDROM
devices which are designed to execute autorun.ini files on CDROM media as soon as the CD is inserted in the
CDROM device. Therefore being able to achieve AutoRun on USB devices was not easily achieved without
installing special software beforehand on the target computer which defeats the whole concept of covertness on
the target computer. This issue was later overcome with the introduction of U3 technology.

USB U3 TECHNOLOGY
U3 technology was Codeveloped by SanDisk and MSystems. It is an open standard platform the aim of which
was to allow users to take their data and portable applications that contain them with them to any USB equipped
Windows Computer and to launch them automatically once the device is connected to a USB port. Applications

written for U3 smart drives were meant to be easy to install and provided users with portability without violating
any copyright laws or enduser licences.
U3’s Ability to Auto Execute Programs
One of the most important features of U3 technology was the seamless launch of applications within the USB
drive. This was done by fooling the Windows operating system into thinking that the USB drive is in fact two
pieces of hardware rather than one. The operating system in this case thinks that the U3 device is actually a CD
ROM device and a USB storage device connected at the same time. The U3 in fact has two parts within it. The
first part is a small part portion of the flash memory space containing an ISO image. The second large part is
the remainder of the flash memory space which is used to store the actual applications and user data.
An ISO image is basically a file with an extension of (.iso). This specifically means that it is compliant with the
ISO 9660 standard which defines a file system for CDROM media. Generally speaking though, the term refers
to any optical disk image. An ISO image contains both data and metadata such as boot code, structures, and
attributes of files. In U3 devices though, the ISO containing portion of the U3 device appears to the computer as
an actual CDROM disk within a CDROM drive which is contains an autorun.inf file which is used to
automatically launch the U3 application. Figure 1 shows how Windows XP sees the U3 device.

Figure 1: The two devices under device manager and as Removable Disk (F:) and CD Drive (E:)
Modifying U3
The hacking community found in U3 a way to run malicious applications automatically and have since tweaked
U3 devices to make them run their applications covertly. This was done by replacing the ISO image on the
original CDROM portion of the U3 drive with another specially crafted ISO CDROM image. ISO images can
be created using any CDROM authoring or burning software that supports output in the ISO format. The
contents of the ISO have to be relatively small in size so that the ISO file remains under the limit of 6,291,456
bytes which is the limit for CDROM portion of the U3 (McGrew 2006).
Simply overwriting the file under the Windows Operating System is not possible because the U3 is a read only
CDROM device and Windows will not allow the operation to proceed. Therefore, an update feature from the
manufacturers of U3 devices was utilized.

ANATOMY OF THE HACK
The simple attack is carried out by abusing the AutoRun feature. First, the attacker downloads the update utility
from the manufacturer’s website and then places his specially crafted ISO image within the same folder as the
update utility. Then, the ISO image is renamed to match the name of the manufacturer’s ISO. The final step is to
connect the U3 device to the computer and execute the update utility. What the utility simply does is replace the
ISO image on the U3 drive with the one it finds in its folder. Figure 2 shows the folder containing the update
utility and the custom renamed ISO file:

Figure 2: Contents of installation folder: Update utility “LPInstaller.exe” and modified cruzerautorun.iso
ISO File Contents
Anything can be placed in the ISO file as long as the ISO file produced remains under the limit of 6,291,456
bytes. Keeping size less than 6 Megabytes will hinder running programs directly from the CDROM portion.
Therefore, all programs have to run from the flash memory portion of the USB. The CDROM portion will act
as the executer and pointer to the location of those programs. To keep size minimal, the proofofconcept ISO
image will contain two files, the automatically executable “autorun.inf” and the “go.vbe” file which is the file
used to locate and launch the malicious code contained on the flash memory portion of the UFD. The malicious
code is referred to hereafter as “the payload” portion of the USB hack or attack. Table 1 shows the source code
for both files which are less than 1 Kilo Byte in size each:

Table 1: Source code for CDROM portion of the U3 hack.

autorun.inf source code:

go.vbe source code:

[Autorun]
open=wscript .\go.vbe

Set objFSO = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Set colDrives = objFSO.Drives
For Each objDrive in colDrives
If objFSO.FileExists(objDrive.DriveLetter & ":\wip\cmd\go.cmd") Then
strPath = objDrive.DriveLetter & ":\wip\cmd"
strcmd = """" & strPath & "\" & "go.cmd" & """"
CreateObject("Wscript.Shell").CurrentDirectory = strPath
CreateObject("Wscript.Shell").Run strcmd, 0, False
End If
Next

The autorun.inf file simply gets executed whenever the U3 device is connected to the computer and all it does is
run a visual basic encoded script (VBScript) file: “go.vbe”. The go.vbe script then searches the computer’s
drives for the following file: “go.cmd” under a specified path. For the sake of this proofofconcept the following
path will be used: “\wip\cmd\”. If the file exists, it is executed by the script. Both folders in the path are hidden
folders created earlier by the attacker and a batch file (go.cmd) is placed there waiting to be invoked by “go.vbe”.
The Payload
So far, nothing harmful or malicious was conducted. The malicious code or “the payload” contains both the
batch file and other (.exe) files. They are both held in the same hidden folder “\wip\cmd” in flash memory
section of the UFD. The payload can be any executable or command line program that can be invoked from a
batch script. The batch file is written in DOS and is neither encoded nor encrypted for this proofofconcept
attack. The programs used in this proofofconcept are either DOS programs available within Windows 200/XP
installations or programs being used by the hacking community for local attacks on Windows systems. Other
programs are password auditing tools and security tools used in live computer forensics or penetration testing.
No new programs or code was specifically written for this proofofconcept. Figure 3 below shows the content of
the “\wif\cmd\” folder:

Figure 3: go.cmd and other programs invoked by it are placed in the same folder.
Batch File Construction
The batch file for this proofofconcept uses an adapted and improved version of MaxDamage’s technique
mentioned on the Hak.5 website (Tobler & Kitchen 2006b). This technique was chosen for its simplicity and
straight forward approach and also for the good selection of tools it provided and simple directory structure.
There are many other techniques available for abusing U3 technology some of them utilize other scripting
languages such as Ruby for scripting and conduct simple tasks such as copying files from target systems or
gathering other information about the system such as browsing history and network connection status (King
2006, McGrew 2006, Tobler & Kitchen 2006b).
The standard Max damage batch script included the following:
•Gathering of environment variables such as computer name, logged in user name and current time.
•Enabling of Admin shares by manipulating a registry value.
•Adding an administrator account on the computer by using the “net user /add” command.
•Using the “net localgroup Administrators {username} /add” command to add the account created to the
local administrators group.
•Manipulating a registry value to the “Special Accounts” user list.
•Using an executable program called PWDump to retrieve SAM file hashes (Fizzgig 2006).
•Using an executable program called ProduKey to retrieve stored product keys (Sofer 2006).
•Retrieving browser history by using VBScript: ”DUH.vbs” (Tobler & Kitchen 2006b).
•Using an executable program called Protected Storage PassView (pspv.exe) to retrieve LSA secrets from
the computer including Outlook passwords, Auto Complete passwords in Internet Explorer, Password
protected sites in Internet Explorer and MSN Explorer Passwords (Sofer 2006).
There are no restrictions on what can be added to the batch file and the payload. However, some considerations
and limitations have to be taken into account. These include:

•The time each tool takes to execute and write to the log file. For the attack to be successful, it has to
execute in a minute or less so it doesn’t raise any suspicions.
•The system resources each tool uses and its impact on the operating system may hint to the victim that
something suspicious is going on.
•The size of the UFD’s flash memory. The size of the payload and copying of files have to be within the
limit of the USB device so it won’t raise a “disk full” alarm.
•The probability that a certain tool will trigger an alert from an AntiVirus or AntiHacking program.
Nonintrusive tools should be used as much as possible and tools that are easily identifiable by Anti
Virus software should be avoided.
Therefore, the batch file used for this paper was chosen with the above points in mind. The improved batch file
added many features including:
•Copying of raw SAM and SYSTEM files from the repair directory of the Windows Operating System
using the xcopy command in Windows XP.
•Document copying depending on the extension and location of files xcopy command in Windows XP.
•Using an updated version of pwDump (version 1.4.2) (Fizzgig 2006).
•Using an executable program called MessenPass v1.08 (mspass.exe) to retrieve messenger program passwords from:
MSN Messenger, Windows Messenger (In Windows XP), Yahoo Messenger (Versions 5.x and 6.x), Google Talk,
ICQ Lite 4.x/5.x/2003, AOL Instant Messenger (only older versions, the password in newer versions of AIM cannot
be recovered),AOL Instant Messenger/Netscape 7, Trillian, Miranda, and GAIM (Sofer 2006).
•Using an executable program called Mail PassView v1.37 (mailpv.exe) to retrieve stored email client
passwords and other account details for the following email clients: Outlook Express, Microsoft
Outlook 2000 (POP3 and SMTP Accounts only), Microsoft Outlook 2002/2003 (POP3, IMAP, HTTP
and SMTP Accounts), IncrediMail, Eudora, Netscape 6 and 7, Mozilla Thunderbird, Group Mail Free,
Yahoo! Mail, Hotmail/MSN mail and finally Gmail (If the password is saved by Gmail Notifier
application, Google Desktop, or by Google Talk) (Sofer 2006)..
•Using an executable program called Network Password Recovery v1.03 (netpass.exe) to retrieve stored
network share LAN or .NET Passport account passwords.
•Using an executable program called CacheDump to retrieve passwords cached by the Local Security
Authority System Service (LSASS) and stored in the registry (Pilon 2005).
•Using an executable program called WirelessKeyView v1.00 (WirelessKeyView.exe) to recover
wireless network keys stored in the computer by the 'Wireless Zero Configuration' service of Windows
XP (Sofer 2006).
•Using the Microsoft Portqry.exe commandline utility to conduct local network reconnaissance
(Microsoft 2006).
•Using an executable program called WinUpdatesList v1.13 (wul.exe) to extract Windows updates
history (Sofer 2006).
The source code for the batch file is provided with this paper as an attachment.
Performing the Attack
For the attack to be successful, the attacker has to have physical access to the target machine. Some of the tools
and attack objectives have to have administrator privileges to be able to perform their tasks. Therefore, the user
logged in at the time of attack has to have to be logged in as administrator on the target machine. Other than that,
the attack is simple and straight forward. Here are the steps for the attack scenario:

1.

Connect the U3 device to the target computer. Social engineering can be used here to convince the user
to allow the attacker to connect his UFD to his computer. The attacker may tell the user that he would
like to copy of the victim’s resume and that he can copy it to his USB device. Or he can tell the victim
that he has a funny video he would like to show him.

2.

Leave the USB device connected to the target computer for about 4560 seconds. The batch script will
not allow the removal of the device unless it finishes executing its payload. Therefore, stalling is
recommended.

3.

Safely remove the U3 Drive from the “safely remove hardware” utility in Windows.

4.

Take the USB device to any other computer and hold down the “Shift” key while connecting the UFD
to the computer.

5.

Browse to the “Removable Storage” portion of the U3 device.

6.

Enable “Show hidden files and folders” option under “Tools”, “Folder Options”, “View”, “Files and
Folders”, “Hidden files and folders”

7.

Browse to: \Documents\logfiles

8.

Open the text file starting with the computer name of the victim machine and ending with “_load.log”.

9.

Also, browse the contents the folder named with the victim’s computer name to find his files there.

The Seriousness of the Threat
As demonstrated above by the amount of information and files that can be copied from the target system as well
as the ability to create administrator level accounts in a very short amount of time, the attack can be devastating
if performed successfully. Therefore, prevention and mitigation of such attacks is important and should be
considered by both corporations and individuals alike.

MITIGATION
The success of the attack depends on many factors. They include:
•Physical and Logical access to the computer’s USB port.
•The AutoRun option of CDROM must be enabled. The default option is enabled.
•Some applications in the payload need administrator level access to work.
•Tools are subject to detection by AntiVirus and AntiHacker software.
•Awareness and education of users.
•Encryption of data and strong passwords
Physical and Logical Access Mitigation
To prevent physical access to the computer, one of these measures must be applied depending on the situation. If
it is a personal computer, the USB ports can be physically cut or disconnected from within the casing of the
computer. As mentioned earlier, some companies went as far as using super glue to block access to their USB
ports (AAP 2006, Lomas 2006). Other aspects of physical access restriction could be access control on doors
and labs where no unauthorized person will be allowed to the areas where the computers reside.
Logical access in this context refers to enabling OS or BIOS level access to USB devices. Logical means to
disable USB devices can effectively prevent their abuse. New motherboards have a disable feature in the BIOS to
disable the USB ports. The best practice is to disable the USB ports in BIOS settings. Then, set a BIOS

password. Case locks should also be used so that users will not be able to open the case, and reset the CMOS
memory (Detwiler 2003).
On the Operating System level, USB use can be disabled by changing the registry value
“HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsbStor\Start” to 4 (Disable). This can be
done on a single computer using “regedit” as seen in Figure 4.
.

Figure 4: Modify the start value from 3 (manual) to 4 (disable).
Group policy can also be used to achieve the same effect on the organizational level by following some simple
steps (Schmidt 2005). If blocking USB devices is an option, then one way of auditing their use can be achieved
by using free third party software such as the “Safend Auditor” which runs as a nonintrusive system task and
logs the types of USB devices connected to the computer, how often they are being used, and by whom. It
produces a report to the administrator, who can then import the data into Excel for analysing (Safend 2006).
Disabling AutoRun
The AutoRun feature of CDROM devices is set to enable by default. To disable it, the following registry key
value has to be changed: “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Cdrom”. The
“AutoRun” value must be changed to “0” (Disable) instead of the default value of “1” (Enable) as seen in the
Figure 5..

Figure 5: Modify the AutoRun value from 1 (Enable) to 0 (disable).
Another way to prevent the AutoRun from executing is holding down the “Shift” key while inserting any
suspicious or untrusted UFD device. This will disable the AutoRun and the malicious code will not be able to
be triggered.

Limiting Privileges
Not having administrator privileges can be considered as a damage limitation measure. Corporations should limit
the privileges given to employees to limit damage from abuse and limit involuntary damage or damage from
social engineering attacks. Two of the most damaging tools of this proofofconcept attack require administrator
access to work. They are the creation of an administrator level user and access to the SAM and SYSTEM files.
Anti-Virus and Anti-Hacker Tools
Antivirus and antihacker tools that are behavioural based rather than signature based will be more effective in
stopping this kind of attack. Table 2 shows a list of AntiVirus and AntiHacker software and their performance
when it comes to the proofofconcept methodology and tools:
Product Name and Version
AVG 7.1.407
BitDefender 9.5
Kaspersky v6.0
NOD32 Antivirus System v2.51.26
Symantec Antivirus
McAfee Internet Security Suit 2007

Performance Level
No tools detected
Some tools detected and alert shown
Passive blocking of some tools and a script alert
No tools detected
No tools detected
Suspicious script detected and prevented from running

Table 2: Tools and their success against the UFD attack.
The table shows that half of the antivirus software failed while the other half had some degree of success. Some
tools such as Kaspersky did not stop the tool from running but showed an alert for the suspicious script but did
not stop it. McAfee on the other hand prompted the user and asked for action to be taken whether it is to stop the
script from running or allow it to run.
Awareness and Education
Raising awareness about the dangers from allowing people to connect USB devices to users’ computers can play
a big role in stopping USB based attacks. This is because these attacks rely on an account being loggedin to
work. Users loggingoff from a workstation are not subject to this type of attack. Moreover, if users hold down
the shit key while a USB is being connected they can not be attacked by this method. Other security related safe
practices also help in defeating this kind of attack. These safe practices include not saving any passwords in
browsers or email client software, and disabling autocomplete in Internet browsers.
Encryption of Data and Strong Passwords
This attack included copying of files from the user’s “my documents” folder, “my pictures” folder, and the
“desktop” folder. This would have not been possible if the user’s files were encrypted. Moreover, some attack
tools used password decryption to reveal the user’s passwords. If strong passwords or long passphrases we used,
tools such as the pwdump would have been defeated (Tobler & Kitchen 2006b).

UFD FUTURE TRENDS
U3 technology was the start of a new trend in portable computing. What U3 aimed to achieve is running portable
applications on a USB device without the risk of user data leak on the host computer. U3 technology needed
application developers such as FireFox to develop “portable” versions of their software that can run completely
from the USB device.

Mojopac
U3 was only the beginning though. A software development company by the name of Ringcube developed
software called Mojopac that can run on any USB 2.0 device and turns it into a virtual computer. Unlike
technologies such as Ceedo, U3 and Migo, which require use of specially adapted programs or a special, extra
cost software adapter, Mojopac does not need any of those. In fact, the Mojopac does not need software
developers to modify their code and make it “portable” (RingCube 2006). Mojopac fools the software installed
on it to think that it is a real computer rather than a USB stick. It also fools the computer to thinking it is the
home drive. This means that users can now carry their applications and data with them wherever they go without
leaving a trace on the computers they use. This trend can present a challenge for digital forensics and security.
One of the major issues with mojopac is the user’s privileges on Mojopac is always Administrator even if he is
logged on the host machine as a normal user. This means that he can install and execute programs that he would
not be otherwise able to under normal circumstances.
Risks to USB Devices
The hacking community have developed a payload for U3 devices called “Hacksaw” that automatically transfers
and installs programs on the target’s Windows computer. These programs then retrieve documents from any USB
drives that are later connected to the infected computer. What the programs then do is compress and securely
email the contents of these USB devices to a prespecified email account. The hack does not require
administrator privileges to run and is very hard to detect by antivirus tools because it uses programs such as
Blat, Stunnel, and Gmail to achieve its goals. Automatic propagation to other USB devices is possible however
was not demonstrated in the proof of concept (Tobler & Kitchen 2006a).

CONCLUSION:
The aim of this proof of concept is to raise awareness about the risk form and to USB devices in general and
UFD devices in particular. UFDs are this generation’s Floppy Disks and as with traditional floppy disks, and as
these devices become more popular, virus writers and malicious code writers will look at these devices as a
transfer vehicle for their code. Malicious code writers always look for maximum damage with the least effort.
UFD devices provide this convenience and are a prime target for abuse. Although the future seems uncertain
when it comes to USB device security and forensics, simple practices such as the ones mentioned in this paper
can go a long way in providing some security against UFD abuse.
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